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COMMENT

HATE VS. HYPOCRISY: MATT HALE
AND THE NEW POLITICS OF BAR ADMISSIONS
Mathew Stevenson

When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get himself accepted in the competition
of the market and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of

our Constitution ....... Justice Holmes (1919).1

Can you imagine, in America, being prevented from
becoming a lawyer due to the free exercise of your speech, and
good-conscience advocacy of your political beliefs? Matt Hale is
the elected "Pontifex Maximus" of the White Supremacist
organization World Church of the Creator. Three years ago,
Hale passed the Illinois Bar examination. Soon thereafter, the
Illinois Committee on Character and fitness denied Hale's
petition for admittance to the Illinois Bar.
As will be
demonstrated, Hale's denial has been completely related to his
unpopular views, and expression of them. After a lengthy legal
battle, including a failed attempt to persuade the U.S. Supreme
Court to hear his case, the decision not to admit Hale stands. At
1.

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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present, Hale's case stands in line to be heard, finally, by the
Illinois Supreme Court. However, the refusal to admit Matt
Hale to the Bar in either Illinois or Montana represents a
flagrant and egregious dismissal of bright-line rules of law,
established by the Supreme Court, over thirty years ago.
The opinion of an inquiry panel for the Third Appellate
District of the Supreme Court of Illinois remains the final
disposition of the case currently available for public review.
More recently, Hale has sought permission to take the Montana
Bar.
In February, 2001, a subcommittee of the Montana
Commission on Character and Fitness recommended the denial
of Hale's application to take the Montana Bar examination. 2 On
June 6, 2001, a separate five-member Committee on Character
and Fitness, empowered with authority over Hale's petition,
decided not to render a final disposition on Hale's case. The
committee believed that "further investigation is warranted"
before Hale's case could be resolved in Montana. 3 To this day,
no decision has been made as to whether Hale will be allowed to
take the Montana Bar examination. While the Montana opinion
is not yet available to the public, one must presume that the
reasoning in Montana for denying Hale echoes the reasoning in
Illinios. The arguments for allowing Hale to practice law, or not,
hinge on the following two positions.
The forces opposing Hale's admission to the bar argue, in
essence, that one such as Hale who has dedicated his life to
inciting racial hatred, 4 and who seeks a constitutional initiative
to abolish the 14th Amendment right to Equal Protection, cannot
"under any civilized standards of decency," 5 possess the requisite
moral character allowing him status as an officer of the court.
Hale also seeks to overturn the Bill of Rights, though by
constitutionally protected means, 6 so that all non-whites may be
7
deported from the United States by an all-white government.

2. Letter from Jan Weber, Bar Admissions Administrator, Commission on
Character and Fitness of the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, to Matthew F.
Hale (Feb. 21, 2001) (on file with author).
3. Letter from Jan Weber, Bar Admissions Administrator, Commission on
Character and Fitness of the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, to Matthew F.
Hale (June 6, 2001) (on file with author).
4. See generally, http://www.creator.org.; Decision of the Inquiry Panel, Before the
Committee on Character and Fitness, In re the Matter of the Application for Admission
to the Bar of Matthew F. Hale, at 11, (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. M.R. 16075).
5. Decision of the Inquiry Panel at 6.
6. See id. at 16.
7. See id. at 4.
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He freely admits that his loyalty to his religion of white
supremacy and separatism, including the crusade against
equality, comes before all of his other loyalties, including his
loyalty to the law.8 Hale unapologetically bandies about racial
epithets. 9 He has a history of public ordinance violations, 10
including physical confrontations, which have resulted from the
expression of his beliefs. 1 Under these circumstances, without
even knowing what the character and fitness standards are, it
would seem that one such as Hale must fail to meet those
12
standards, in Illinois, Montana, or anywhere else.
Yet the legality of the question is not so simple. The
argument in Hale's favor is well-encapsulated by his lawyer's
following assertion: "The Committee's denial violates Hale's
constitutional equal protection and due process rights because it
is arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable
and invidiously
discriminates against Hale in retaliation for the exercise of his
First Amendment freedoms, and directly violates Hale's First
Amendment rights of speech and association."' 1 3 While Hale's
opponents concede that "he is certainly entitled to his own
beliefs and the free expression thereof," they argue that "the
issue is whether Mr. Hale possesses the requisite character and
fitness for admission to the practice of law .,14 Hale's lawyers
respond that "The Illinois Bar's exclusion of Hale, based on
nothing more than his beliefs and advocacy, is in direct conflict
with nearly 50 years of constitutional precedent."15 They
emphasize the latest line of cases, ending in 1971, which deal
with the issue of the treatment of political speech in assessing
applicants' admission to the bar. Hale's lawyers quote the 1971

8. See id.
9. See id.
10. It is important to note, however, that Hale has never been convicted of a crime
which has not been overturned on appeal.
11. See Decision of the Inquiry Panel, supra note 4, at 6; (note also that Character
and Fitness Committees tend to look upon physical confrontation with particular
disfavor).
12. ILL. SUP. CT. P.R. 4.1. According to this rule, applicants have the burden of
proving their own good moral character to the committee. This is a uniform requirement
for bar applicants in each state.
13. Petition for Review and Suggestions in Support, In re the Application for
Admission to the Bar of Matthew F. Hale at 2 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. M.R. 16075)
[hereinafter Petition].
14. Findings and Conclusions, Before the Committee on Character and Fitness, In
re the Application to the Bar of Matthew F. Hale at 2, (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. M.R.
16075) [hereinafter Findings and Conclusions].
15. Petition, supra note 13, at 11.
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case of Baird v. Board of Bar Examiners: "It is sufficient to say
we hold that views and beliefs are immune from bar association
inquisitions designed to lay a foundation barring an applicant
16
from the practice of law."'
However distasteful Hale's speech may seem to the majority
of Americans, the speech that has cost him his law license is
political in nature. Therefore, according to the latest case law
on the issue, Hale's speech is immune from the considerations of
the character and fitness committees. And, since Hale's beliefs
and expression of them are the overwhelming reason for his
denial, when that speech is excised from consideration, what
remains is an inadequate foundation for the denial of Hale's
license on other grounds. This is the crux of both sides of the
issue, the disposition of which depends on the consideration of a
number of factors, now to be discussed.
FUNCTION OF THE CHARACTER AND FITNESS COMMITTEE

Each state bar maintains a character and fitness committee
to regulate the admission of each state's lawyers. In Montana,
the purposes of the committee are specifically defined "to assure
the protection of the public and safeguard the justice system.
An attorney should be one whose record of conduct justifies the
trust of clients, adversaries, courts and others with respect to
the professional duties owed to them."' 7 "Good Moral Character"
in Montana "refers to the qualities of fairness, discreteness,
honesty, reasonableness, (and) unquestionable integrity...,"1
In one seminal character and fitness committee case, the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that states can set their own high
standards in defining good moral character and enforcing it as a
requirement, because states have a substantial interest in
protecting the public from unscrupulous lawyers and the like. 19
In addition to meeting the burden of high moral character
proposed by one's state bar, an applicant has the additional
burden "of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he or
20
she is possessed of good moral character."
Character and fitness committees' powers are ultimately
16. Id.
17. Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Character and Fitness of the
Supreme Court of Montana, effective November 17, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter referred to as
Rules of Procedure].
18. Id. at 2.
19. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239, 77 S.Ct. 752, 756 (1957).
20. Rules of Procedure, supra note 17, at 4.
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governed by state Supreme Courts, on whose behalf they
adjudicate. 2 1 But clearly, a great deal of power has been placed
into the hands of character and fitness committees to grant or
withhold the future professional life of a candidate to the bar.
As one might expect, certain limits exist regarding the extent to
which state bars can define and enforce their particular
definitions of "good moral character."
SCHWARE V. BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
During the 1950's and 1960's, interest in Marxist ideals and
methods became fairly common in American academic and
intellectual circles.
Before that time, the role of political
ideology in the assessment of potential bar candidates remained
a virtually unaddressed issue. With the case of Schware,
though, the Court had to answer several hitherto unanswered
questions with respect to the constitutional limits placed upon
state bar character and fitness committees. The issue presented
in Schware dealt with the extent to which a character and
fitness committee may infer lack of moral character on the part
of a candidate who refused to answer questions about his or her
own political advocacy. 22 But the Court is Schware also
addressed the question of the extent to which character and
fitness committees' enforcement of their "good moral character"
standards may impinge upon the constitutional rights of bar
applicants.
First, they cited a series of cases, which held that "a state
cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any
other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."23 Naturally, character and fitness committees
cannot do their jobs if prospective lawyers' rights to free speech
are to be interpreted as literally absolute. So to strike a balance
between the absolute reign of free speech and the absolute
power of character and fitness committees' enforcement of their
particular "good moral character" standard, the Court in
Schware codified an important rule: "A state can require high
21. Id. at 12.
22. Schware, 353 U.S. at 246, 77 S.Ct. at 760. The Court in Schware concluded
that state bar character and fitness committees cannot infer a lack of moral character on
the part of a candidate simply due to a candidate's refusal to answer questions about
their own political leanings and/or dealings. But since this issue is tangential to the case
at hand, all discussion of Schware shall be limited to the relevant dicta.
23. Schware, 353 U.S. at 238-239, 77 S.Ct. at 756.
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standards of qualification, such as good moral character...
before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification
must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or
24
capacity to practice law."
While the court in Schware made no attempt to define what
this "rational connection" might mean, later courts would. No
cases exist to help determine whether a racist's politics relate to
the Court's vision of the "rational connection" to the fitness and
ability to practice law. But for purposes of comparison, the last
time the court tried to draw this elusive line was in the case of
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond. There, the Court
determined that a state could deny an applicant's admission to
the bar for advocating the violent overthrow of the United States
government, but only if that advocacy were coupled with the
specific intent to achieve that end. 25 Precious few cases have
attempted to define the rational connection standard set forth in
Schware. The last time it was defined, the Court ruled that
actively advocating the violent overthrow of the United States
government could not be defined as a lack of good moral
character sufficient to justify a character and fitness committee's
rejection of a bar application.
Put another way, in cases where the Court has interpreted
the extent of the permissible curtailment of bar applicant's
constitutional rights by character and fitness committees, the
court has chosen to severely restrict the right to reject bar
applicants based on their political ideologies. Right or wrong,
racists have never been denied their law licenses for espousing
their views, so case law does not exist on this issue for the
purpose of direct comparison. However, if actively advocating
the violent overthrow of the United States government cannot
be defined as a lack of moral character, the presumption clearly
lies with the applicant, not the committee.
I argue that
distasteful, though non-violent racial bigotry cannot be defined,
by the given parameters of the court system, as a lack of moral
character.
Until the Supreme Court changes the above
definition from Law Students Research Council, character and
fitness committees are obliged to try and operate from within
that definition. I contend that Matt Hale's conduct and beliefs
do not exceed that definition. As a result, he should not be

24. Id. at 239, 77 S.Ct. at 756.
25. Colin A. Fieman, A Relic of McCarthyism: Question 21 of the Application for
Admission to the New York Bar, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 47 (1994).
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denied bar admission on character and fitness grounds in
Illinois, Montana, or anywhere else.
MATT HALE'S RECORD

Of course, neither the Illinois nor the Montana Committees
on Character and Fitness are limited to considering Hale's
political and racial beliefs in an attempt to deny his admission to
the bar. All applicants' records of general conduct are open to
scrutiny. In Montana, "evidence of any of the following will be
treated by the Commission as cause for further inquiry before
the Commission decides whether the applicant possesses the
character and fitness to practice law: unlawful conduct,
academic misconduct," false or misleading statements in the
bar application process, "misconduct in employment, acts
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, abuse
of legal process," and neglect of financial or professional
responsibilities, court order violations, current mental illness,
drug or alcohol dependency, "denial of admission to the bar in
another jurisdiction on character and fitness grounds, and
disciplinary action by a lawyer disciplinary agency or other
professional disciplinary agency of any jurisdiction, or any other
conduct which reflects adversely upon the character and fitness
of the applicant." 26 In assessing these criteria, committees also
consider the following: the applicant's age at the time of the
conduct, the conduct's recency, reliability of information about
the conduct, the conduct's seriousness, factors underlying it, the
cumulative effect of the conduct or information, evidence of
rehabilitation, applicant's positive social contributions since the
conduct, candor in the admissions process, and the materiality of
for
any omissions or misrepresentations.2 7 The above criteria
28
Montana are the substantive equivalent to those in Illinois.
As previously stated, Hale heads The World Church of the
Creator, one of the largest racist organizations in America. In
addition to his role as a racist leader, the Illinois committee
considered a series of public ordinance violations originating
with Hale's beliefs. In 1990, police arrested Hale for violating a
city ordinance by publicly burning the Israeli flag and in another
26. Rules of Procedure, supranote 13, at 5-6.
27. See id. at 6.
28. Brief for Mr. Hale, In the Matter of the Application for Admission to the Bar of
Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. M.R. 16075) [hereinafter referred to as
Matthew F. Hale at 6, (Ill.
Brief for Mr. Hale].
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instance, he was found guilty of distributing hand bills.2 9 Hale
failed to mention the latter incident in his bar application,
claiming to be under the impression that the application sought
only "criminal" activity, while his conviction, a city ordinance
violation, was merely "illegal" conduct. 30
In 1991, while
disseminating racist literature, a group of black men brandished
a baseball bat, threatening Hale and his brother. Hale's brother
took out a gun, and the men disbursed. Police later found Hale
who, after a half-hour of driving around in the squad car as the
police searched for his brother, claimed not to have known who
31
the man (his brother) was.
Hale was convicted of felony obstruction of justice, but the
conviction was later overturned by the Illinois Supreme Court
on Miranda grounds. 32 In 1992, police arrested Hale for assault
and battery on a mall security guard, after he allegedly pushed
and attempted to punch the guard in an incident stemming from
a disagreement concerning Hale's beliefs. 33 The charges were
later dropped. Soon thereafter, however, Hale was nearly place
on academic probation by Bradley University for calling a fellow
student a "Jew Boy. ' 34 In 1998, Hale was cited for littering as
he threw his organization's newspapers from his automobile. 35
In addition to these instances, the Illinois Character and Fitness
Committee considered a series of disparaging comments publicly
made by Hale against people who disagree with his views. A
final incident occurred during a prayer breakfast against racism
at Bradley University. Hale attended the breakfast, and he may
have given a Nazi salute there. 36
Regardless of the above incidents, Hale has never been
convicted of a crime in excess of a public ordinance violation. At
a glance, these incidents may appear adequate as "proof' that

29. Committee on Character and Fitness' Response in Opposition to Matthew F.
Hale's Petition for Reviewto the Illinois Supreme Ct., p. 3-4. (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. M.R.
16075) [hereinafter Response in Opposition].
30. Hale's Brief at 6, Before the Committee on Character and Fitness for the
Supreme Court of Illinois, In re the Application of Matthew F. Hale (1999).
31. See id. at 4-5.
32. See id. at 5.
33. See id. at 5.
34. See The Committee on Character and Fitness' Response in Opposition to
Matthew F. Hale's Petition for Review: In the Matter of the Application for Admission to
the Bar of Matthew F. Hale at 5, (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. M.R. 16075) [hereinafter
referred to as Response in Opposition].
35. See id. at 7.
36. See id. at 3.
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Hale's racism equates to a lack of good moral character. To the
contrary, the inquiry panel's recitation of these incidents serve
Hale's defense. A footnote in the inquiry panel's own written
decision undermines their reasoning, and the entire case against
Hale. The most serious incidents enumerated by the panel were
two convictions of city ordinance violations. The inquiry panel's
decision states quite plainly that
Mr. Hale was convicted of two city ordinance violations related to
the advocacy of his beliefs. The Inquiry Panel attaches no
significance to these convictions because countless individuals
have been admitted to the Bar with more serious criminal
violations. Additionally, the Inquiry Panel has doubt as to the
legality or at least the appropriateness of these convictions
because they relate to the exercise of constitutionally protected
activity and Mr. Hale
may have been selectively prosecuted on
37
account of his views.

In spite of the inquiry panel's displeasure at what likely
amounted to the selective prosecution of Hale due to his beliefs,
the panel chose to continue the inquisition by rejecting his
admission to the bar for reasons based exclusively on his beliefs
and his free expression of those beliefs. Every single item of
"misconduct" enumerated against Hale by the inquiry panel falls
into this category. The panel correctly refuses to consider actual
convictions against Hale based on activities related to his
beliefs. Yet they chose to consider all of the other listed
"misconduct," which amounted to no convictions or even
criminal charges. We know this because every thought word
and deed discussed in the panel's decision originates with Hale's
beliefs and his expression. Absent these lesser incidents, the
panel would have been left with nothing upon which to base
their rejection of Hale's application.
In spite of the inconsistency of 1) questioning the legitimacy
of considering public ordinance violations convictions related to
Hale's beliefs, then 2) refusing not to consider lesser incidents,
equally related to his beliefs, the inquiry panel, perhaps due to
this inconsistency, still attempted to "prove" Hale's lack of moral
character. The forces seeking to deny Hale admission to the
Illinois Bar have used, in addition to the cataloguing of his
record (as previously discussed) five essential arguments in an
attempt to defeat him. One line of argumentation has been an
attempt to "prove," by various definitions, that Hale lacks good
moral character, and that he must therefore be denied Bar

37.

Decision of the Inquiry Panel, supra note 4, at 6.
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admission. This argument has depended primarily upon the
notion that Hale's leadership in his racist organization violates
certain "fundamental truths" about equality. Ergo, Hale will
inevitably be disbarred for misconduct, so better to deny him
now. Another, related attack on Hale has relied on a strict
interpretation of international law, and the idea of the right to
freedom from bigotry, and therefore, freedom from Hale.
The third and fourth lines of reasoning against Hale are
also related. The first of these maintains that Hale's devotion to
his religion of racism trumps his devotion to upholding the law,
and that in turn renders him unable to represent blacks and
other minorities. As a result, Hale's inability to represent
everyone equally makes him an unfit applicant to the Bar. This
relates to the fifth line of argumentation against Hale, according
to which Hale cannot in good conscience take the required oath
to give equal protection to all, as an officer of the court,
according to the 14th Amendment.
This is because Hale
continues to publicly proclaim his desire to overturn the 14th
Amendment, though by legal means, in order to have all nonWhites and Jews deported from the United States.
HALE REJECTED FOR DENYING "FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS"

The essence of the general disbelief in Mr. Hale's good moral
character is well captured by the following statement of the
inquiry panel, in their decision to reject his application; "if the
lack of good moral character and general fitness to practice law
may be judged on the basis of active advocacy that attempts to
incite hatred of members of various groups by vilifying and
portraying them as inferior and robbing them of human dignity,
Mr. Hale has not established good moral character or general
fitness to practice law."38 To the inquiry panel that denied Hale,
at the "heart of their analysis" were the "fundamental truths" of
the Constitution, Emancipation Proclamation, and the
Fourteenth Amendment. 39 So "to the extent its decision limits
the First Amendment activities of lawyers, the fundamental
truths identified above are so basic to the legal profession that,
in the context of this case, they must be preferred over the
values found in the First Amendment (of the Constitution)."' 40
The inquiry panel also concluded that "the constitutional
38.
39.
40.

Decision of the Inquiry Panel, supra note 4, at 6.
Id. at 14.
Id.
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issues involving a case precisely like this one are open, and that
the Illinois requirement for moral character ... to practice law
precludes the applicant from being certified." 41 As proof of this,
the panel cites their own analysis of the issue from earlier in the
opinion. 42 This analysis lacked a single legal citation to
authority of any kind, stating, in sum, that "Under any civilized
standards of decency, the incitement of racial hatred for the
ultimate purpose of depriving selected groups of their legal
rights shows a gross deficiency in moral character."43 Lacking
any legal authority with which to equate Mr. Hale's lack of
moral character, the inquiry panel's choice to cite its own
opprobrium for Hale is an understandable desperate means of
denying someone they do not like. However, opprobrium should
never substitute for a valid legal solution. Character and fitness
committees have had to strike a bargain in order to curtail
certain (like 1st and 14th Amendment) rights otherwise held by
aspiring attorneys. They must deny admission only upon an
adequate showing that their denial follows a reasonable
precedent established by the profession. Clearly, character and
fitness committees cannot follow precedence if they choose not to
follow their own rules, and prior case law.
Since the inquiry panel could not find a single rule or case
to enforce their assertion, it goes without saying that their
unsupported opinion cannot substitute for the rule of law.
Ultimately, this hollow position led to skewed anecdotes in the
footnotes as the panel grasped at straws to justify its position.
"Bigotry, as well as evil generally, is bottomed on irrationality.
By contrast, our legal system is designed to produce rational
results." 44 The inquiry panel seems content to drive their mack
truck of faulty reasoning through the gaping hole where a valid
legal position should stand. Irrespective of the law, since they
cannot conceive of how someone who so offends them could
possess good moral character, they have grasped at straws for a
means of denying Hale. But of themselves, Hale's language and
advocacy, the only factors considered in denying him, are not
relevant to the hearings.
Offensive language cannot be
45
penalized consistent with the First Amendment.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 6-7.
43. Decision of the Inquiry Panel, supra note 4, at 7.
44. Id. at 7.
45. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942); Gooding v. Wilson, 92 S.Ct.
1103 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 92 S.Ct. 2483 (1972); Lewis v. City of New Orleans,
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While the panel conceded "that the State cannot penalize
petitioner solely because he espouses illegal aims,"46 (though
they saw fit to penalize him for being offensive) the panel even
failed to show where Hale had even espoused illegal aims. In its
conclusion, the panel argues that "while Matthew Hale has not
yet threatened to exterminate anyone, history tells us that
extermination is sometimes not far behind when governmental
power is held by persons of his racial views." 47 That is, in
absence of legal authority, speculation about Matt Hale's future
goals of extermination substituted for evidence of his lack of
moral character, and that speculation served as the key, as
admitted by the inquiry panel, in its decision to deny Hale. The
attempt to prognosticate future bad acts from past advocacy,
and hence to punish a public official based on that prediction is
a tactic specifically rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bond
48
v. Floyd.
Upon denial of Hale's petition for a hearing by the Supreme
Court of Illinois, justice Heiple, dissenting, stated "I believe this
court should address whether it is appropriate for the
Committee to base its assessment of an applicant's character
and fitness on speculative future actionable misconduct." 49
Heiple found novel the panel's use of their "fundamental truths"
to trump Hale's constitutional rights, and so found "that the
constitutional question deserves explicit, reasoned resolution by
this court. Instead, the court silently accepts the conclusion of
the Committee."5 0 Indeed, the majority gave no reasoning to
their decision. Regarding Hale's case, Heiple's dissent remains
the sole written opinion issued by that court.
HALE'S LOYALTY TO HIS RELIGION

By focusing on Hale's loyalty to his "religion," the committee
sought to undermine any notion of his good moral character by
casting doubt on his ability to obey the law and serve the court.
Hale acknowledges that the "Sixth Commandment" of Creativity

92 S.Ct. 2499 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 92 S.Ct. 2507 (1972).

46.

Application of Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 28-29, 91 S.Ct. 713, 727 (1971).

47.

Id.

48.

Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 133, 87 S. Ct. 339, 348 (1966).

49. Petition for Full Review by Illinois S. Ct. filed at 1, (Nov. 17, 1999) In re
Matter of Matthew F. Hale, 723 N.E.2d 206, 243 Ill. Dec. 174 (1999) (No.M.R. 16075)
[hereinafter Petition for Full Review by Ill. S. Ct.].
50. Petition for Full Review by Ill. S. Ct. at 1.
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requires him to put his "own race above every other loyalty."5 1
The "Seventh Commandment" of Hale's religion requires him to
give preferential treatment to whites in business dealings. 52
The inquiry panel stated that "a reasonable question for the
applicant is what happens when that loyalty (to race) conflicts
with his oath to support the United States and Illinois
Constitutions?" 53 It seems a fair question, but is not a relevant
one in a legal sense.
First, Hale's reputation for dealings with minorities in a
legal atmosphere has been surprisingly respectable. While
working for a respected Illinois lawyer of over 25 years, Brian
McPheeters, Hale worked with McPheeters' secretary, who was
married to an African-American, and who had a biracial child.
Though Hale and his church view such relationships with strong
disapproval, his views were never interjected into the
workplace. 54 McPheeters testified at Hale's hearing that Hale is
able to separate his personal convictions from his professional
responsibilities. 5
The inquiry panel confirmed that when Hale had dealt with
black clients, he engaged in no acts of racism toward them. 56
Additionally, Hale testified that regardless of what his religion
may represent, he could swear to protect and defend the U.S.
and Illinois Constitutions.5 7 And in the dissenting opinion of the
inquiry panel, Lawrence W. Baxter, panel member, made a vital
point about this. Hale
plausibly asserts he can hold racist views and practice laws in
accordance with his oath as an attorney and there's no evidence of
any conduct otherwise. Until there is such conduct, (we cannot
deny) certification to an applicant who will subscribe to the
oath... (Heightened) scrutiny is not a requirement. It is replaced
by the applicant's promise to subscribe to the
oath and to comply
with the Code of Professional Responsibility. 58
In sum, the law requires that if Hale claims that he can uphold
the law, his claim must be taken seriously. The fallback position
for the state is their right to disbar an applicant if his oath
proves to be insincere, not to deny him on a hunch that the oath
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Response in Opposition, supra note 34, at 6.
Id. at 12.
Decision of the Inquiry Panel, supra note 4, at 8.
Petition, supranote 13, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Decision of the Inquiry Panel, supra note 4, at 5.
Response in Opposition, supra note 34, at 11.
Decision of the Inquiry Panel, supranote 4, at 19.
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will be broken.
HALE VIOLATES "FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS" OF

UN'S UNIVERSAL

DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Lacking any specific case or statutory law in which to
anchor its argument that Hale's racist beliefs should preclude
his membership in the Illinois bar, the committee refers to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) to buttress its
assertion. "Let it be said that the Bar and our courts stand
committed to these fundamental truths: All persons are
possessed of individual dignity... every person is to be judged
on the basis of his or her own individuality and conduct, not by
reference to skin color, race, ethnicity, religion, or national
origin," and that "the enforcement of these timeless values to
specific cases have by history and constitutional development
been entrusted to our courts and its officers - the lawyers - a

trust that lies at the heart of our legal system. '59 Only with
difficulty can one argue against the sentiment behind these
values.
However, sentimental appeals in a legal context often signal
a lack of legal foundation. Unless International Law has been
violated, good lawyers seldom if ever rely on the International
Declaration of Human Rights for a winning argument. While
noble, documents such as the Declaration of Human Rights
provide at best a murky legal framework, precisely because they
are so vague. Invariably, the rules from American case and
statutory law provide a better framework for comparing and
adjudicating new cases. One can only speculate why the
"fundamental truths" of the Declaration of Human Rights,
quoted above, should take precedence over some of the
document's other positions, such as Article 19, providing that
"everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression;
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference" (such as would be denial to a Bar based on political
0
beliefs). 6
The committee's justification, based on provisions of the UN
charter, and in ignorance of its other parts, should set off red
flags concerning the legitimacy of its legal standing. As stated
in the petition for review of Hale's case, "The Illinois Bar's
59. Id. at 13.
60. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. GAOR, III,
U.N. Doc. A 810.
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attempt to define and regulate so-called 'fundamental truths' by
excluding non-believers from the practice of law represents a
dangerous precedent. It assumes that any of us can know the
truth with a high enough degree of certainty so as to justify
61
deprivation of a man's livelihood."
HALE'S RELIGION OF RACISM VS. THE CONSTITUTION

The argument that Hale's racism renders him unfit for
lawyering becomes more sound when rooted in the United
States Constitution, rather than in the UN Charter. The
committee posits this problem: "Hale testified that he could
swear to protect and defend the United States Constitution, the
Illinois Constitution, and the laws of the State of Illinois. Hale,
however, acknowledged that the 'Sixth Commandment' of his
'religion' requires him to put his 'own race above every other
loyalty. '62
They also point out that the "Seventh
Commandment' of Hale's religion
requires preferential
treatment in business dealings with whites." 63 To this effect,
Hale has stated to the committee that "I probably would never
have a black client personally."64 Hence, the committee has
taken the position that "Mr. Hale's publicly displayed views are
diametrically opposed to the letter and spirit of Rule 8.5(a)(5) (of
the Rules of Professional Conduct) 'which forbids adverse
discriminatory treatment of others." 65 For the committee, the
essence of the issue is that "Mr. Hale's beliefs do not exempt him
66
from obeying the same rules as every other attorney."
Once again, the moral argument against Hale is much
stronger than the legal argument. It seems axiomatic that Hale
will violate, at the very least, Rule 8.5a of the Rules of
Professional Conduct by "adversely discriminating against
others" based on race.
However, speculation that future
violations of these rules will occur has never been a viable
method for the Character and Fitness Committee to reject an
applicant. The best source for the rule on this matter is found in
the last of the line of cases dealing with the issue of bar
61. Petition, supra note 13, at 24 (citation omitted).
62. Response in Opposition, supra note 29, at 11 (citations omitted).
63. Id. at 12.
64. Id. at 13.
65. Findings and Conclusions, Before the Committee on Character and Fitness,
Supreme Court of Illinois, Third Judicial District at 3 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. M.R.
16075) [hereinafter Findings and Conclusions of the Committee].
66. Id. at 4.
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applicant rejections based on political beliefs. In Law Students
Research Council, the Court advocated the "least restrictive"
means of protecting the public from inchoate violations of the
Professional Rules by aspiring lawyers. 67 This "least restrictive"
method did not include speculation about an applicant's future
conduct based on political beliefs. Rather, the Court advocated
the wisdom of using the deterrent and punitive effects of postadmission sanctions as the principal means of policing the
68
conduct of prospective attorneys.
As pointed out by the ACLU of Illinois on Hale's behalf,
"[disciplinary rules, contempt sanctions, civil suits and the
threat of criminal prosecution are all tools at the disposal of
courts and citizens who are disaffected in their interactions with
attorneys in Illinois."69 As pointed out in Lawrence Baxter's
dissent from the decision of the inquiry panel, "The Rules of the
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the
Illinois Supreme Court are the profession's and the public's
protection against any abuse. That such abuse may occur is
only speculation at this time." 70
And such speculation,
particularly in Hale's case, is egregious because it is based
strictly on his beliefs and expression of those beliefs, not upon
his conduct. While a legal intern, Hale's secretary was married
to an African American, and they shared a biracial child, a
matter which Hale and his church view with disapproval.
However, Hale did not interject his views on the matter into the
workplace, and he treated his secretary in a professional and
courteous manner.7 1 Hale also told the committee that during
his legal clerkship, he dealt with black clients and engaged in no
acts of racism toward them. The accuracy of this statement was
confirmed by independent inquiry. 72 Hale testified that he
would work toward repeal of the anti-discrimination laws of
Illinois, but that in the meantime, he would comply with those
laws.7 3 Finally, Brian McPheeters, the lawyer supervising
Hale's internship, testified that Hale could comply with the

67.

Law Students Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 167 (1971).

68.

See Id.

69. Amicus Brief of American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, In the Matter of the
Application for Admission to the Bar of Matthew F. Hale at 5-6, (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No.
M.R. 16075) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of the ACLU].
70. Decision of the Inquiry Panel, supra note 4, at 19.
71. Petition, supra note 13, at 5.
72. Decision of the Inquiry Panel, supranote 4, at 5.
73. Petition, supra note 13, at 20.
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professional requirements with respect to the provision of legal
services to racial minorities. 74 In terms of policy considerations,
as pointed out by the ACLU, "the danger is clear, - no future
applicant to the bar in Illinois may hold and express unpopular
views no matter how sincere their intent may be to adhere to the
'75
oath and ethical code for Illinois attorneys.
"PROOF" OF HALE'S LACK OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER

At this point in the discussion, the reader may find the
defense of Hale interesting on a point-by-point basis, but
ultimately a losing battle. After all, Hale is undeniably racist
bigot. The reader may suspect that exposure to any of Hale's
hate-speech or literature would make the stomach churn, and
render the prospect that the man possesses good moral
character inconceivable. That would make sense. But any one
of us would admit that however justifiable our emotional
responses, the law must remain more sober and neutral than
any one of us individually can. Even Hale's opponents have
recognized this, and attempted to "prove" a lack of moral
character on a point where the law is, for them, stiflingly
unhelpful.
Again, regardless of how one interprets the importance of
Hale's racial views, he and all applicants must make a forceful
showing of their own good moral character. Among the first in
the line of cases to discuss this issue, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Konigsberg stated that a definition of good moral character
would include "whether on the whole record a reasonable man
could fairly find that there were substantial doubts about
(applicant's) honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of
others and for the laws of the state and the nation." 76 Naturally,
the bar of Illinois, in denying Hale, chose as their preferred
definition of good moral character this "reasonableness"
standard from Konigsberg.77 Accordingly, in the final line of
their decision, it is only reasonable that "The Bar of Illinois
cannot certify someone as having good moral character and
general fitness to practice law who has dedicated his life to
inciting racial hatred for the purpose of implementing those

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Amicus Brief of the ACLU, supra note 69, at 7.
353 U.S. at 252.
Brief of the Committee, supra note 28, at 7.
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views. 7 8
If the Kongisberg reasonableness standard still
governed who should and should not be admitted to the bar
based on good moral character, then Hale's denial should stand.
After all, "a reasonable man (or woman)" in this nation generally
will find Hale lacking in moral character, to say the least. But
Konigsberg was admitted to the bar in 1960, partly because he
was a "vigorous supporter of civil rights," and "indicated openmindedness."7 9
By the end of the 60's, the inadequacies of such narrow
notions of good moral character factored into the Court's
thinking. The 60's bore witness to the reality that honest people
could, in good conscience, possess vastly different ideas about
right and wrong. As previously stated, by the time of Baird in
1971, mere membership in an organization actively dedicated to
the violent overthrow of the U.S. government was not, by itself,
sufficient to brand an applicant to the bar as one lacking in
moral character.
Though most "reasonable" people would
probably have agreed, even in 1971, that one actively advocating
the violent overthrow of the government lacked moral character,
the Konigsberg standard had been replaced by a much more
liberal standard. And this liberal standard, reinforced later in
1971 by Law Students Research Council, remains the standard
to which we must adhere today.
The Illinois Court's decision to refer to the "good moral
character" standard from Konigsberg (1960), rather than to the
more nuanced definitions of Law Students Research Council and
Baird (both 1971), reflects a return to a more willfully narrowminded outlook on what constitutes political speech.
To
adjudicate the way it did, the court in Hale's case had to
circumvent the development in the law in this area, culminating
in the U.S. Supreme Court's proclamation in Baird that: "The
First Amendment's protection of association prohibits a State
from excluding a person from a profession or punishing him
solely because he is a member of a particular political
organization or because he holds certain beliefs."8 0
Indeed, Hale does hold certain beliefs, and as the Bar of
Illinois has stood in judgment of those beliefs, so has Hale been
left off the Bar. As stated in Hale's petition for writ of certiori,
"when petitioner's views and rhetoric are redacted, the only

78.
79.
80.

Decision of the Inquiry Panel, supranote 4, at 18.
Konigsberg, 353 U.S. at 264.
401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
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remaining charges are incidental arrests for ordinance
violations, and allegations related to Petitioner's exercise of his
constitutional rights."8'
And, as previously stated, the
committee freely admitted that "The Inquiry Panel attaches no
significance to these convictions because countless individuals
have been admitted to the Bar with more serious criminal
violations," and because Hale "may have been selectively
prosecuted" due to his beliefs.8 2 So, by the Committee's own
admission, all that remains is the de facto violation of the above
decree from Baird. What makes the Committee's willful
violation of the most recent and relevant case law on the subject:
Baird, Law Students Research Council, and In re Stolar, all
1971 cases, even more egregious is that all these cases are in
essential agreement with one another in making a clear attempt
to extend protections to prospective lawyers from Bar denial
based on political beliefs. No cases have come down since 1971
to challenge the principles founded by these cases.
In absence of precedence to aid in the denial of Hale on
grounds of prejudice against his politics, the Illinois Bar has
sought to circumvent precedence by making a special case of
Hale. This has required special measures. The response in
opposition to Hale's petition for a writ of certiori contends that
"Hale's doctrines and conduct are potentially lethal."8 3 In none
of the other aforementioned cases on this topic have the
doctrines of the applicants been so categorized. The Illinois Bar
also contended "the First Amendment would not be violated
under the present circumstances (because) Illinois' legitimate
interest in preventing racial discrimination outweighs Hale's
interest in spewing racial venom."8 4 The Inquiry Panel found
that their "fundamental truths" must be "preferred over the
values found in the First Amendment."
Once again, while these arguments have great emotional
appeal, they are riddled with inherent legal flaws. First, the
forces opposing Hale cannot even decide whether his First
Amendment rights are being violated. If they are not, it is
because (absent any legal citation) the rights of the state come

81. Reply to Brief in Opposition at 4, Hale v. The Committee on Character and
Fitness of the Illinois Bar Cert. Denied, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000), cert. Denied, (No. 99-1349).
82. Decision of the Inquiry Panel, supranote 4, at 6.
83.
Response in Opposition, supra note 34, at 18.
84. Brief in Opposition to Granting Writ of Certiori to United States Supreme
Court at 19, Hale v. Committee on Character and Fitness of the Illinois Bar, et al., 530
U.S. 1261 (2000) (No. 99-1349).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2002

19

LAW
REVIEW
MONTANA
Montana
Law Review, Vol.
63 [2002],
Iss. 2, Art. 8

Vol. 63

before one such as Hale. If his rights are being violated, it is
justifiable because the "fundamental truths" of the United
Nations trump Hale's rights. Either way, he shall be left off the
Illinois Bar. In addition, even at the time of Konigsberg, the
Court recognized that "A bar composed of lawyers of good
character is a worthy objective, but it is unnecessary to sacrifice
vital freedoms in order to obtain that goal."8 5 In other words,
Hale is indeed entitled to his freedom of speech, "and it is also
important to society and the bar itself that lawyers be
unintimidated- free to think, speak and act as members of an
86
Independent Bar."
In recognition of Substantive Due Process, the 1971 case of
In re Stolar determined that a prospective lawyer's rights to
belief and association could not be impinged upon absent a
legitimate government interest.8 7 Preventing the "spewing of
racial venom," and its equivalent, has never been recognized by
the Supreme Court as a legitimate government interest
sufficient to curtail free speech, even for lawyers. However, the
Illinois Bar's argument is irrelevant in any case. Keeping Hale
off of the Bar will not prevent him from "spewing venom," and in
no way serves the purpose to which Hale's denial is ostensibly
directed.
HALE CANNOT PRACTICE THE LAW, IF HE WISHES TO DESTROY IT

The last, and perhaps most compelling of the arguments
against Hale is that one who wishes to deport all non-whites
from the United States, and who openly admits his desire to
work for a change in the law to allow this end, cannot possibly
be deemed fit as an officer of the Court. Specifically, the
deportation of non-whites requires suspension of all such
people's 14 th Amendment Right to Due Process.88 In fact, Hale
admits that his life's mission entails bringing about peaceable
change in the United States in order to deny the equal
protection of the law to all non-white Americans.8 9 None of the
forces against Hale advocate curtailing Hale's right to express
his desire to limit constitutional rights to whites. Specifically,
the inquiry panel suggests that a "balance" has already been
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Konigsberg, 353 U.S. at 273.
Id.
353 U.S. at 265.
Decision of the Inquiry Panel, supra note 4, at 4.
See id.
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struck, by which Hale is permitted to speak of such sweeping
changes to the law as he sees fit, and even to incite racial
hatred, but that he cannot do this as an officer of the court. 90
The crux of the argument is that rights such as the 14th
Amendment are so fundamental as to comprise the very rule of
law. "Mr. Hale's life mission, the destruction of the Bill of
Rights, is inherently incompatible with service as a lawyer or
judge who is charged with safeguarding those rights."91 The
prospect of allowing one such as Hale to take the oath to become
an officer of the court, while advocating the overturn of the very
rule of law, represents a patent absurdity.
The position seems relevant, but once again, no legal
precedence exists to give the argument substance. The line has
never been drawn to demarcate which laws a prospective lawyer
may permissibly advocate overturning, and which laws must
remain forever off-limits to the scrutiny of lawyers-to-be. Hale
testified that while working to peaceably to change the law as he
sees fit, he had "no reservation or hesitation in subscribing to
the oath required of him."92 That oath requires attorneys to
swear that they "will support the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the state of Illinois," and to
"faithfully discharge the duties of the office of attorney and
counselor at law to the best of their ability."93 The Committee
challenges Hale's sincerity in taking the oath, and claims the
right to deny him based on their finding of lack of sincerity "lest
it be said that the Committee has no obligation to protect the
' 94
public from unsavory individuals."
Yet the Committee is not so empowered to challenge the
sincerity of the oath taker. This issue had been resolved, again,
back in 1971, with the case of Law Students Research Council.
Then, the Court held no more is required of a bar applicant than
"a willingness to take the constitutional oath and ability to do so
in good faith." 95 How do we know if the oath is taken in good
faith? That issue had been resolved in Bond (1966), where the
Supreme Court held "the oath taker's willingness to accept the
oath creates an irrebutable presumption of the oath taker's
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
(1971).

See id. at 14-15.
Id. at 16.
Brief for Mr. Hale, supra note 28, at 3.
Id.
Response in Opposition, supra note 34, at 19-20.
Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, 401 U.S. 154, 91 S. Ct. at 720
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sincerity."96 Ergo, if Hale swears that as a lawyer, he shall
uphold the law, the character and fitness committee is bound to
honor that pledge, not to second-guess it. Manifold measures,
including disbarment, remain open for imposition by the bar in
the event that a lawyer chooses not to uphold the law. And
what of Hale's desire to overturn the 14th Amendment? As
stated by Mr. Baxter's dissent from the decision of the Inquiry
Panel; "the holding and even active advocacy of beliefs, no
matter how repugnant to current law, cannot be the basis for
denial of certification to an applicant who will subscribe to the
oath. All lawyers disagree with some laws."97 Again, the forces
opposing Hale at no point cite precedence to demonstrate how
his desire to overturn the 1 4 th Amendment should create a
special case.
The committee periodically digresses from its own positions,
perhaps in realization of its weak legal legitimacy.
This
underscores the ultimate reason why Hale should be admitted.
The inquiry panel articulated the following summation of its
own position: "The Inquiry Panel did not base its decision to
deny admission to Applicant solely upon his beliefs or upon his
membership in the World Church of the Creator. There is ample
evidence of actions taken by Applicant that he is not of good
moral character."98 According to this reasoning, Hale's beliefs
are not at the heart of the Panel's reason for denying him.
Rather, Hale's "actions," specifically, criminal charges
(dismissed) and public ordinance violations are the cause of
condemnation for Hale's application. Yet this same panel had
previously "attached no significance to these convictions." 99
Rather, the panel "doubted the appropriateness of these
convictions because they related to the exercise of
constitutionally protected actitivity" and had resulted in Hale's
"selective prosecution." 10 0 Put another way, the forces opposing
Hale find in his distasteful speech inappropriate grounds upon
which to condemn his application. The committee and the panel
have also voiced their opinion that Hale's actions cannot fairly
be used against him for the purpose of dismissing his bar
application. And though neither Hale's speech nor his actions
present fair grounds to condemn Hale, taken together, they
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Bond, 385 U.S. at 116, 87 S. Ct. at 339.
Decision of the Inquiry Panel, supra note 4, at 19 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
In the Matterof the Application for Admission to the Bar of Hale at 9-10.
Decision of the Inquiry Panel, supra note 4, at 6.
Id.
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somehow can be used against him. 0 + 0 = 1. The illogic, and
lack of legal precedence for the case of bar denial for Matthew F.
Hale should, by now, be clear.
Precisely for this reason, Montana should allow Hale to take
the Bar here. At the present moment, the public is not privy to
any information regarding Hale's case, save the mere fact that
the Montana subcommittee on Character and Fitness has
recommended denying him, and the regular committee has
tabled Hale's case pending further inquiry.' 0 ' The Montana
Supreme Court will likely hear Hale's case on appeal. 10 2 If and
when they do, they should exercise their right to reverse the
committee's decision.
First, the Bar of the state of Montana has not been
notoriously stringent in its character and fitness standards. In
fact, not since cases from the early nineties, In re Pederson,10 3 In
re Matt, 0 4 and In re Steele 0 5 have cases of character and fitness
refusals gone to the Supreme Court only to have the rejections
affirmed. 106 In Pederson's case, the committee and the Supreme
Court based their denial on a number of debt collection actions
against the defendant (traditional grounds for denial), and one
such action involved a lawsuit. 0 7
Additionally, several
complaints had been filed with the Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission against Pederson during his tenure as
a lawyer in Illinois, where Pederson was, at the time of the

101. I have contacted the Montana Committee on Character and Fitness in search
of any information possible. No information of any kind was made available, in spite of
assurances of the importance of such information to this Law Review article.
102. Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Character and Fitness of the
Supreme Court of Montana,
effective November 17, 1998. These codified Montana Rules make abundantly clear,
throughout, that the Character and Fitness Committee adjudicates only at the pleasure
of the Supreme Court of Montana, and that any decision rendered by the Character and
Fitness Committee in this state is subject to review by the Supreme Court.
103. In the Matter of the Verified Petition for Review of the Decision of theCharacter
an Fitness Committee
on the Application of Kenneth J. Pederson, 250 Mont. 325, 820 P.2d 1288 (1991).
104. In re Matt, 252 Mont. 345, 829 P.2d 625 (1992).
105. In re Steele, 262 Mont. 481, 865 P.2d 285 (1993).
106. Unfortunately, these cases must serve as the context for the bar
admission/denial in Montana, because cases where the Supreme Court has overturned
the ruling of the Committee on Character and Fitness are not available for public review.
The reason is that if a petitioner is found, after review by the Supreme Court, to possess
the requisite character, their reputation should not be tarnished by public scrutiny of
their less than ideal histories, simply because those histories had been question by the
Character and Fitenss Commitee.
107. Pederson,250 Mont. at 328, 820 P.2d at 1290.
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hearing in Montana, also the defendant in a malpractice action.
Pederson had failed to disclose his attorney-client difficulties to
the Montana character and fitness committee. 108
In the case of Matt, another former bar member, this time
from Nebraska, the committee and ultimately the Supreme
Court denied the applicant for his failure to consistently and
truthfully answer questions about possible drug dealing. 109
During the hearings against him, Matt both admitted to the use
of drugs, and claimed that he "hadn't ever used drugs.""10 Matt
also misled the committee about charges for dealing cocaine, ten
years previous, which were dropped only after Matt's agreement
to perform 100 hours of community service.'1 1 In spite of the
evidence against Matt, and his lack of forthrightness in the
application process, both justices Gray and Trieweiler dissented.
Trieweiler voted for Matt's admission to the bar, while Gray
argued for remanding the case for further proceedings." 2 In the
case of Steele, following a history of tax evasion (prime
traditional grounds for bar denial), criminal investigations into
such conduct, and a litany of lies about such evasion on the bar
application, 113 the Supreme Court affirmed denial, again with
4
Trieweiler dissenting."
The point is that in all of these cases, rare as they are in
Montana, the applicants had willfully and egregiously evaded
the committee's inquiries into matters of obvious relevance. In
all cases, the conduct in question was more serious, so far as its
legal relevance is concerned, than anything Hale has ever been
accused of, let alone convicted of. Also, the pattern of evasion in
these cases was far more systematic, and ill-explained. And yet
these cases were marginal enough that the Supreme Court
granted them a hearing. One can only speculate how many
denials, only slightly less marginal in legitimacy, were
overturned by the Supreme Court, allowing applicants with
questionable histories to become lawyers in this state.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id.
Matt, 252 Mont. at 355, 829 P.2d at 630.
Id. at 352, 829 P.2d at 629.
Id.
Id.at 366-68, 829 P.2d at 637-39.
Steele, 262 Mont. at 489, 865 P.2d at 290.
Id. at 495, 865 P.2d at 294.
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CONCLUSION

"Throughout its history, the moral fitness requirement has
functioned primarily as a cultural showpiece. In that role, it has
excommunicated.., variously, women, minorities, adulterers,
radicals, and bankrupts... and in so doing often debased the
ideals it seeks to sustain." 115 The trilogy of Konisberg, Schware,
and Baird served to progressively remedy the capricious
application of fashionable standards in character and fitness
meetings, once and for all. Since the 1971 trilogy of Baird, In re
Stolar, and Law Students Research Council, the determination
not to consider political speech in bar admission proceedings has
seemed well settled. A year later, in 1972, Montana drafted a
new Constitution, the tenor of which echoes the open-minded
decisions rendered in the 1971 trilogy. The 1972 Montana
Constitution provides that "neither the state nor any person,
firm... or institution shall discriminate against any person in
the exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race,
color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or civil
rights.""16 The Montana Constitution institutes language for the
protection of minorities in a state where minorities of many
stripes have historically been marginalized by a monolithic,
dominant mainstream culture. The Constitution leaves no room
for the toleration of people's rights to be enforced capriciously.
Who but the Matt Hale's of the world could the words of this
Constitution have been meant to protect?
Of course, Hale's imperfect record, and imperfect recitation
of that record can be used against him by the Character and
Fitness Board, irrespective of his political beliefs. But Hale's
imperfect record, standing alone, does not meet the cumulative
standard by which applicants have traditionally been denied.
Illinois committee members blended Hale's imperfect record
with their personal repugnance at his political views to conjure
up a formula worthy of their dismissal. Yet their repugnance
should have played no role in the decision. Partly as a result of
this, Hale continues to gain members, purportedly at record
pace, as he touts himself on his hate-site as the "First
Amendment Martyr." 117 By the letter of the law, he appears to
be right. Bar committees everywhere are in a uniquely difficult
115. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Characteras a ProfessionalCredential,94 YALE L.J.
491, 493-94 (1985).
116. MONT. CONST., art. II, § 4.
117.
http://www.wcotc.comJindex.shtml
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position so long as the Matt Hales of the world wish to practice
law. But institutions have been so challenged ever since vocal
minorities, with unpopular views, have sought the enforcement
of their rights according to the words of the Constitution.
According to Justice Black, from Konigsberg, "It is neither
natural nor unavoidable in this country for the fundamental
rights of people to be dependent upon the different emphasis
different judges put upon different values at different times."
Precisely those value systems which seem most ill-founded to
the majority must be allowed, regardless of their seeming
stupidity or evil, to make their way into the marketplace of ideas
and assume their rightful place as failures. This free-flow of
ideas cannot materialize if the legal profession lives up to its
reputation for loopholes and politicization, and marginalizes
those holding unpopular views. The legal profession should feel
strong enough to withstand such characters as Hale, or
question: How free is the marketplace of ideas upon which we
depend in our search for justice in the law? These policy
considerations deserve full consideration by a Montana Supreme
Court governed by a progressive Montana Constitution. Equal
Protection requires that Montana allow Matt Hale to take the
Montana bar examination, and if he passes it, to practice in this
state.
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